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Abstract
The automotive industry is moving towards a more connected ecosystem, with
connectivity achieved through multiple wireless systems. However, in the pursuit of
these technological advances and to quickly satisfy requirements imposed on manufac-
turers, the security of these systems is often an afterthought. It has been shown that
systems in a standard new automobile that one would not expect to be vulnerable
can be exploited for a variety of harmful effects.
This thesis considers a seemingly benign, but government mandated, safety feature
of modern vehicles; the Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS). Typical implemen-
tations have no security-oriented features, leaking data that can be used for reliable
tracking by a determined attacker, and being completely open to spoofing attacks.
This research investigates potential privacy concerns of TPMS, first by demon-
strating the feasibility of both identifying vehicles and reconstructing their routes
without prohibitive cost or expertise. Then, an ID obfuscating scheme is proposed,
called TPMS Obfuscation through Rolling ID (TORI), to mitigate these privacy
threats while remaining true to the design requirements of TPMS. Various conditions
are tested using a modified traffic simulator, which validate the ability to reconstruct
the identities of vehicles even from sparse detections.
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PRESERVING PRIVACY IN AUTOMOTIVE
TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING SYSTEMS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
For over ten years, Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems(TPMS) have been a required
feature on nearly all consumer vehicles. TPMS has been very helpful in terms of
safety and convenience, warning drivers when a tire is outside of a safe range or has a
slow leak. However, security features are absent from current systems, allowing any
observer with a radio and basic signal processing knowledge to pick up the packets
broadcast by the sensors. The packets themselves hold little inherent value; even if
an attacker were given thousands of them, it would reveal little about a vehicle or its
driver. However, by aggregating these packets and their timestamped location data,
this information can become collectively valuable. The ability to accomplish such an
attack is just one symptom of a system without any security measures. The integrity
and availability of the system can also be compromised with basic equipment, which
can be leveraged for physical effects, such as convincing a driver to pull the car over to
check the tire. While the impacts of some of these attacks may seem minor, they can
presently be used in a larger scheme, and should not be ignored given the ubiquity of
these systems and potential safety implications. This research focuses primarily on
the privacy concerns in TPMS, but the impact of the solution presented here called
TPMS Obfuscation through Rolling ID (TORI), will be evaluated in light of attacks
on the integrity or availability of the system as well.
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1.2 Problem Statement
This research examines the security concerns of Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems.
Because of the lack of security features, and in the absence of sufficient research into
potential exploits, there are several avenues of investigation that could be pursued.
This document focuses on privacy concerns that result from the lack of obfuscation
leading to easily obtainable tire data, specifically the unique ID associated with a
given tire. It experimentally shows the feasibility of identifying and tracking vehi-
cles using TPMS data, and investigates a solution to greatly increase the difficulty
of attacking these systems while remaining within the constraints of the operating
environment. Additionally, the question of how much information is required to track
(or alternatively, what information needs to be obfuscated) is explored to examine
the impact of potential security features. Transportation is one of the United States’
16 critical infrastructure sectors [1], and with four of these devices on most consumer
vehicles, the sheer number of these devices on the road presents a significant attack
surface. A widespread exploit could have dire consequences.
Attack Scenarios.
The feasibility of tracking using Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems could present
opportunities for attackers to gain valuable information about drivers. Detectors are
relatively small and concealable, so their presence is unlikely to be noticed. Consider
the following scenarios, gradually increasing in impact, depending on the determina-
tion of an eavesdropper:
• Binary Detection - An adversary places the minimum number of detectors nec-
essary to ensure that they can determine whether or not a target is in a specific
location. This could be one detector at the end of a driveway, or perhaps at
every entrance and exit to a suburban neighborhood to cast a wider net. It
2
is very reasonable to then leverage this information to establish pattern-of-life
data about the group of victims and enable general burglary or targeted crime.
• Targeted Tracking - An adversary places detectors at a controlled entry point
for a location of interest, for example the parking area for a technology firm.
This detector could be oﬄine, and picked up later to harvest the gathered data.
After receiving the desired amount of data, the attacker then drives through
residential areas where employees are likely to live with a mobile detection unit.
If a tire ID match occurs, an employee is identified, and that address is flagged
as being associated with the location of interest. This information could be
used for later corporate espionage or for a type of spearphishing attack.
• Full-Scale Tracking - Depending on the resources available, complete tracking
of a large number of vehicles could be accomplished by deploying detectors
at intersections. Results presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate that monitoring
as little as 10% of intersections can lead to reliable vehicle identification, and
increasing coverage can lead to higher tracking accuracy between observations.
This could be used with good intentions, such as keeping a database of tire IDs
and monitoring major highways to find vehicles used in crimes. It could also
enable the abuse of such information, as can be imagined when you know the
whereabouts of nearly every vehicle in a designated area.
1.3 Research Questions
The goal of this research is to test the feasibility of using TPMS data to identify
and track vehicles. Within that question, the research tested how traffic and sensor
conditions affect the results. Additionally, the research explored what solutions are
effective and feasible to combat attacks that have been demonstrated or hypothesized.
3
The following supporting questions guided this research.
• What are the safety implications of TPMS vulnerabilities?
• What risks to privacy does TPMS present?
– Can TPMS data be used to track vehicles?
• Can the privacy and integrity vulnerabilities of TPMS be quantified?
– What evaluation metrics are appropriate?
• What is the effectiveness and cost of TORI?
1.4 Organization
Chapter II provides the background necessary to establish the problem and de-
velop an experiment to test the research goals. Chapter III describes the methodology
and design decisions that are used to test the association and tracking algorithms.
The simulation conditions and data flow are presented, along with the details of the
programs used to track vehicles. Chapter IV analyzes the results of the experiments.
It explores the trends and impact created by the different simulation conditions, along
with potential explanations and improvements for future simulation. Chapter V sum-
marizes the document and discusses avenues and objectives for future research in this
area.
4
II. Literature Review
2.1 Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems
The introduction of Tire Pressure Monitoring System, hereafter referred to as
TPMS, has increased safety by reducing the number of vehicles with one severely
under-inflated tire by 55.6% [2]. Tires under-inflated by 25% or more, the threshold
for a TPMS warning light, “. . . are 3 times as likely to be cited as critical events in the
pre-crash phase”[3]. When equipped with a monitoring system, drivers are rapidly
warned if there are issues with the tire pressure in any of their tires, allowing them
to take timely measures to prevent further damage. The operating environment, a
rotating wheel, necessitates wireless devices to measure and transmit data, resulting
in a system with an attack surface that does not require physical contact with the
vehicle, and shortcuts that expose vulnerabilities. The dependence on a battery, and
the requirement for a long service life, impose significant constraint on the design and
implementation of TPMS systems. Despite being a requirement on most new vehicles
in the United States for over a decade, there has been little literature examining TPMS
from a cybersecurity standpoint. One goal of this document is to shed light on the
potential malicious uses of these devices, and spur research and security improvements
before any serious exploits are found in the wild.
History of Legislation.
In the United States, steps toward mandating TPMS on new vehicles occurred
after a series of fatalities related to defective tires. The Transportation Recall En-
hancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act was rapidly passed by
the U.S. Congress (2000), and called for a mandated system to warn drivers when
a tire is significantly under-inflated. The National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
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tration drafted the more detailed requirements, requiring compliance on new vehicles
beginning September 1, 2007 [4]. These requirements included reporting to the driver
if one or more tire was 25% below minimum pressure, within 20 minutes of the pres-
sure dropping. The European Commission likewise mandated TPMS on new vehicles
after 2012 as part of a safety and emission-reduction program [5]. As a result, there
are millions of these sensors on the roadways, with a growing percentage of TPMS-
equipped vehicles as older cars are removed from the roadway.
Methods of Measurement.
There are two primary ways for the TPMS mandate to be fulfilled; indirect and
direct measurement. The key difference between these approaches is that indirect
measurement uses wheel speed and known wheel size to calculate pressure, while
direct measurement embeds sensors in the tire to gather true measurements. Direct
measurement necessitates wireless communication to achieve these results. Indirect
measurement can be achieved with wired communication, but with a loss of accuracy.
Indirect Measurement.
Indirect measurement leverages input from sensors that are already in use by
other systems in the vehicle. Specialized software can estimate pressure changes by
monitoring minor changes in wheel speed that are a result of small changes in wheel
diameter, which in turn are a result of a tire pressure differential. These systems have
the advantage of using existing hardware, but have several drawbacks that make it
poorly-fitted to meet legal requirements. Indirect TPMS is less accurate, doesn’t have
truth data for the actual tire pressure, and can give false readings when non-standard
tire sizes are used or if tires lose pressure simultaneously [6]. As a result, the vast
majority of vehicles incorporate direct measurement.
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Direct Measurement.
Direct TPMS is the standard used in most vehicles today. It is composed of a
pressure sensor, a battery, and transmitting hardware placed inside the tire, typically
integrated with the valve stem which is pushed through the rim to allow for inflation.
A picture of an example device used during this research is shown in Figure 1. Because
the sensors must last the life of the tire, battery life is a critical consideration. To
meet these constraints, the sensors must not use any energy when the car is parked.
When the vehicle stops, typically the accelerometer on the devices takes note and
stops transmitting after a period of being stationary, such as 10 minutes. When
a car is turned on, a low frequency wake up signal is sent to the sensors which
awakens them from a standby state. For further energy savings, the sensors typically
only transmit every 1-2 minutes during normal operation, or more frequently if a
problem is detected or a wake-up signal is sent. The vehicle is equipped with either
four individual antennae, or a single centralized receiver. This approach is much
more accurate than an indirect method, with accompanying higher costs, but also
introduces wireless vulnerabilities, which are presented in Section 2.2.
Figure 1. OEM TPMS Direct Measurement Sensor
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Typical Implementation.
For direct measurement, the wireless protocol is straightforward. Notably, infor-
mation is only transmitted one way, from sensor to main vehicle, thereby relieving
the sensor of the cost of powering a receiver. The in-tire module reads the pressure
and temperature sensors, constructs a data packet, encodes using a method such
as Manchester Encoding, and finally transmits it using Amplitude Shift Keying or
Frequency Shift Keying. An example packet might include 32 bits of ID, 8 bits of
pressure data, 8 bits of temperature data, 4 bits of status flags, and 12 bits of a Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC), as shown in Figure 2. The ID assigned to a sensor and
broadcast with every packet does not change for the lifetime of the device. This leads
to the naming convention used in the remainder of this thesis, Static TPMS, referring
to the static IDs belonging to each sensor. None of the data in a packet is encrypted
or obfuscated for security, allowing any listener in proximity to read this data. One
reason for the lack of security is the energy cost that encryption or two way com-
munication would require. Existing sensors must be completely replaced when the
battery is depleted, with a typical lifespan being five to ten years. The batteries are
usually set in epoxy and therefore not replaceable, while size and weight requirements
prevent the use of a larger battery.
ID︸︷︷︸
32 bits
PressureReading︸ ︷︷ ︸
8 bits
TemperatureReading︸ ︷︷ ︸
8 bits
Flags︸ ︷︷ ︸
Variable
CRC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Remaining bits
Figure 2. Allocation of bits in an example TPMS packet
2.2 Attack Scenarios
Introductory work on attack scenarios against TPMS was done by [7] as a case
study for in-car wireless networks.
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Spoofing.
The researchers demonstrated that spoofing packets is trivial once the packet and
transmission characteristics are determined [7]. The first proof of concept shown
was to spoof a packet with the ID “DEADBEEF” and pressure value of 0 PSI on a
TPMS trigger tool. These trigger tools are handheld receivers that transmit TPMS
wakeup signals and can be configured to read the packets, used to check the status of
a vehicle’s sensors. They then spoofed low-pressure packets to a real vehicle, where
they were able to illuminate the TPMS warning light falsely, even when spoofing from
another vehicle while the victim and attacker were traveling at high speeds.
Denial of Service.
The low transmission power of TPMS sensors is easily overpowered by either nar-
row or broadband frequency jamming. However a noisy attack such as this is fairly
easy to detect, and the driver would also be warned that the sensor is unresponsive.
Focused methods would be more difficult to trace. For example, [7] were able to deny
the functionality of the service in two ways: first as a part of a spoofing attack, result-
ing in unreliable readings, and secondly, and apparently inadvertently, by disabling
the TPMS Electronic Control Unit(ECU). In the process of testing packet trans-
mission frequency, the researchers disabled the ECU, illuminating a ‘Check TPMS
System’ warning, and causing the car to display no tire pressure information. At-
tempts to restart or recover the ECU were unsuccessful, and the only solution was
to replace the ECU at a dealership, demonstrating that packet spoofing can lead to
permanent cyber-physical effects.
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Demonstrated Attacks on Vehicles.
As the infusion of technology into vehicles continues, interest into the exploitation
of that technology has grown. One of the most notable are the exploits described in [8],
in which the researchers penetrate several vehicles including a 2014 Jeep Cherokee,
through multiple attack surfaces. Features such as the entertainment system and
cellular access allowed them to inject payloads into the vehicle, controlling systems
such as braking, locks, headlights, and the instrument cluster. Exploits that stall the
engine, disable the airbags, and disable power steering are described in [9, 10], and
require fairly minimal resources once a connection to the CAN bus is established.
The ECU that communicates with the TPMS may control other vehicular systems,
raising concern that the TPMS receiver ECU may become the next attack surface to
launch these demonstrated payloads.
2.3 Tracking
Tracking Algorithms.
There are many algorithms available for tracking objects, often tailored to the
detectable data and the specific problem space. Several have been tested against a
real-world vehicular data set, including those based on particle filters, Markov Chains,
and RANSAC [11]. From the input data, these algorithms typically create many pos-
sible paths which get progressively refined. Researchers have been able to constrain
particle filters to road networks to reduce computational effort and uncertainty in
results [12].
Tracking using these algorithms has been shown to be effective, but this research
explores the possibility of modelling the road network as a graph data structure,
rather than as particles. This would automatically incorporate assumptions about
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where a vehicle could travel and change routes, without having to modify other algo-
rithms. Additionally, using these structures could leverage available Graph Theory
algorithms and optimizations. Even when a tracking algorithm performs well, it can
have difficulty associating tracks to identities, which is the primary contribution of
this research. Future work could therefore use TPMS as a detection and association
tool, to feed into a more typical tracking algorithm.
Tracking Via TPMS.
Rouf et al. also explored the feasibility of tracking a vehicle via TPMS transmis-
sions [7]. Given the ID’s of the four tires associated with a vehicle, which do not
presently change, it is simple to associate this with the identity of a vehicle. There
would need to be over one billion vehicles on the road to even approach a 1% chance
of misidentifying a vehicle, given the data from all four tires, without considering
any other factors such as geographic location. Admittedly, there are some formidable
challenges to creating an eavesdropping infrastructure, particularly with passive data
collection. The low power transmissions from the sensors limit the range of receivers,
so a large number of eavesdroppers must be placed to be guaranteed to capture the
infrequently transmitted packets. A more effective solution explored by the same
researchers would be to stimulate a transmission with the low frequency activation
signal, and have a high frequency receiver co-located. While noisier and slightly more
complex, this could be used to guarantee a reading at points of interest for those
who wish to track using TPMS. They concluded their section on tracking with a
comparison to a system in use, Automatic Number Plate Reading (ANPR). Tracking
via TPMS would have the advantage of a higher read rate (99% vs 90%) and not
requiring Line of Sight, but would require changes to the legal system to be effective
for law enforcement.
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2.4 Pseudo-random Number Generators
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator(PRNG) is a type of Deterministic Random
Bit Generator(DRBG) which produces a pseudorandom sequence of bits using an
initial seed and potentially other inputs [13]. True random number generation is
difficult to achieve, and is actually not desirable for the application in this document.
PRNGs rely on a cryptographically secure one-way function to operate. Given the
same initial conditions, a PRNG will always generate the same sequence of numbers,
however an outsider should not be able to increase their odds of determining the next
number that will be output. A block cipher with a secret key is considered a suitable
one-way function to operate as a PRNG [14].
There are many valid block ciphers which could be considered sufficiently secure
for the requirements of the rolling ID scheme proposed in Chapter 3. Therefore, the
options must be weighed using additional criteria. The TPMS environment currently
necessitates low-power operation. Many of the challenges of the TPMS environment
are shared by Internet of Things (IoT) devices, creating a wider body of research
from which to draw. Certain block ciphers have been designed specifically for low
construction and power costs, and considered in this section. This section does not
seek to prove that a specific implementation is optimal, but will examine a select few
to demonstrate what should be considered in a future device and pick one to use as
an example in later investigations.
SIMON.
The SIMON and SPECK family of block ciphers proposed in [15] were designed
to be flexible and secure block ciphers that could be tuned for a wide variety of
platforms. SPECK is tuned for optimal performance in software, while SIMON is
tuned for hardware performance. The current size of a typical tire ID is 32 bits,
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so for compatibility and minimizing complexity this is an ideal block size. These
protocols support a 32 bit block size with a 64 bit key. In practical implementation,
this key could be printed in a format such as hex, base64, or QR code on the sensor
to be read before installation. The implementation of this specification in the paper
is referred to as SIMON32/64. It can be implemented in a Gate Equivalent (GE)
area of 523 gates. Not all block ciphers can be configured to operate with blocks and
keys this small; for size comparison, Table 1 shows the GE, flash memory, and SRAM
required for different ciphers to be implemented on 64 bit block sizes
Table 1. Gate Equivalent Area for Block Ciphers (64 bit block size)
Cipher Name Gate Equivalent flash (bytes) SRAM (bytes)
SIMON[15] 838 274 0
SPECK[15] 984 186 0
TWINE[16] 1011 1304 414
PRESENT[17] 1030 487 0
PICCOLO[18] 1043 unavailable unavailable
KATAN[19] 1054 272 18
KLEIN [20] 1478 766 18
PRESENT was shown to have feasible power and size requirements in [21], however
the goal of that paper was to show that PRESENT can be used, not to determine how
ideal it was. Based on the hardware requirements of SIMON in relation to PRESENT,
and the fact that PRESENT is not implemented for 32 bit block size, SIMON can be
expected to operate within the constraints as well.
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2.5 Proposed TPMS Security Improvements
Some researchers have proposed solutions to increase the difficulty of TPMS track-
ing and spoofing attacks by obfuscating the packet ID. [22] proposed a system which
incorporates pseudo-ID’s, sequence numbers, message authentication codes, and ses-
sion keys, solving many of the privacy and integrity issues present. However, this
system requires a 3-way handshake to establish the key, and current TPMS sensors
are not equipped to receive data. [21] examined the cost of encryption on the sensors
and demonstrated that an implementation of the PRESENT protocol could be used
within the typical constraints. [23] proposed a system using a Linear Feedback Shift
Register to generate a new ID, using the initial state and a polynomial as the shared
secret between sender and receiver. This achieved the goal of rolling, or hopping IDs,
but did not explore issues of desynchronization between the parties. [24] proposed a
system with rolling ID’s and optional encryption, and tested their system on develop-
ment hardware to demonstrate feasible power consumption. Their system extended
packet size and required a 3-way handshake to establish a session ID, which is not
possible with one-way communication.
2.6 Summary
This chapter presented the background information and research surrounding
TPMS. The history and operation of TPMS devices was described, along with attack
scenarios that it presently faces. Expanding on the tracking attack scenario, simula-
tion conditions necessary to demonstrate feasibility were examined, as were tracking
algorithms that could be used by an adversary. Several PRNGs were compared to
determine one that would fit the constraints of TPMS to enable an updated version
to mitigate a tracking attack. Other solutions in literature were briefly reviewed, but
were shown to be missing elements that are desirable in the operating environment.
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Information from this chapter was used to construct a simulation environment and
set of experiments, propose a solution, and test the feasibility of tracking and the
potential gains of an updated TPMS.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes experiments to analyze TPMS susceptibility to tracking
and proposes a solution, referred to as Tire Obfuscation through Rolling ID (TORI).
TORI solves many of the known vulnerabilities of Static TPMS, and increases the
difficulty of exploiting those that remain. To understand the privacy risks of Static
TPMS and the proposed TORI solution, the remainder of this chapter details the
experimental design of an appropriate simulation.
The first task is to simulate the flow of traffic, including creating a road network,
generating traffic, and placing detectors to gather TPMS data. This chapter then in-
troduces the tasks of tire association and route reconstruction that an attacker would
have to accomplish in order to track a vehicle using TPMS data. The algorithms for
the Associator and Route Reconstructor are presented, along with a scoring metric
to compare the results between experimental conditions. Details of applying this ex-
periment to TORI are discussed, including the potential for collisions that may be
introduced.
3.2 Recreation of Past Work
Proof-of-Concept spoofing experiments were recreated early in the research for
this document. First, a USRP N200 Software Defined Radio (SDR), with a GNURa-
dio program was used to detect the packets. Figure 3 is a picture of the TPMS trigger
tool used to induce a packet broadcast for a sensor from a 2012 Toyota Avalon. The
SDR detected the packet, which was then decoded in MATLAB. After determining
the packet encoding and structure, the SDR was configured to send spoofed packets,
which could be set to any ID, Temperature, Pressure, and Battery Level. This activ-
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ity demonstrated that successful eavesdropping or spoofing is trivial to accomplish,
as the frequency and keying scheme are available from the FCC, and no security
obstacles were present in that device. An attacker with enough time to determine
the exact structure of all the TPMS sensors on the road, or insider knowledge, could
detect and decode packets from any vehicle. The same information can also be used
to successfully spoof packets and convince a TPMS receiver to forward erroneous
information to other onboard systems such as the instrument cluster.
Figure 3. Handheld TPMS Reader
3.3 TORI
This section describes the implementation of Tire Obfuscation through Rolling
ID (TORI). The goal of TORI is to render the IDs in TPMS packets unusable to
an attacker. Accomplishing this goal mitigates the ability to track using TPMS and
hardens the system against spoofing. The ID hopping scheme is described here,
which requires a PRNG and secret key to generate Pseudo-IDs. The requirements for
a receiver to understand sensors equipped with TORI is then described.
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ID Hopping.
An alternative system that could enhance privacy would ideally also match the
current structure when possible, to maximize backwards compatibility. Therefore, in
the proposed TORI system, the basic packet structure of an ID, pressure, tempera-
ture, flags, and CRC would remain. The proposed change simply allows for a hopping
ID. Currently, the sensor IDs are transmitted in the clear and do not change, so with
enough reception points it would be simple to associate these ID’s with a single vehi-
cle. In TORI, the sensor would utilize a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
which takes the last ID and a unique secret key associated with that sensor as input
to generate the next ID. Such a system would have seemingly random hopping ID’s,
defeating tracking by preventing an eavesdropper from easily associating ID’s with a
specific vehicle. An attacker seeking to spoof packets would not be able to guess the
next ID without the secret key, defeating simplistic attacks based on spoofing. (Note
that a sophisticated attacker, after collecting a significant number of messages, may
be able to determine the secret key. However, the cost to the attacker is significantly
higher in this case.) The key elements required to implement the ID hopping scheme
are described in greater detail below.
Pseudo-random number generator.
A number of lightweight block cipher implementations exist and could be used as
pseudo-random number generators. These are designed for low power applications
and require a low Gate Equivalent value, roughly denoting the number of transistors
required to implement it. These include PRESENT, Simon, XTEA, KTANTAN, and
Piccolo, among others. For the remainder of this paper, the Simon protocol will
be used as an example of a suitable cipher, though the purpose is not to provide
in-depth analysis of the optimal choice. Simon is a lightweight protocol tuned for
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hardware implementation proposed in [15], and published by the National Security
Agency (NSA). It can be implemented in many different key and block sizes, allowing
it to be extended for longer keys or packet sizes in the future. These are discussed in
greater detail in Section 2.4
Pre-shared key.
The solution proposed here would require a secret shared key between the sensor
and receiver. Currently, the 28 or 32 bit ID for a sensor is usually printed in hex
directly on the sensor casing, which is inaccessible once it is installed in the wheel
and a tire has been mounted. This ID would be replaced with a secret key of longer
length, which could still be printed in hex or in another format, such as a QR code,
directly on the sensor. This key would be registered with the vehicle by a dealer or tire
shop upon installation, to allow the vehicle to recognize its own tires. (Incidentally,
this sets the upper effort threshold for determining the key at removing the tire and
reading the sensor key or being present at installation, but that would require such
targeted effort that it is not considered a scenario to be addressed by TORI. If such
threats were realistic, then the key could be printed on a separate card and stored
somewhere safely or destroyed after registration.) Note that these secret keys are
intended to last the lifetime of the sensor, which may remain with the wheel even as
tires wear out and are replaced, but is presently limited by battery life.
Pseudo-IDs.
In the table below, the Simon protocol is used to generate a hopping sequence of
32 bit pseudo-IDs as a function of their previous ID and a 64 bit secret key. Simon
is implemented in 64 bit key mode, with a 32 bit block size, in Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode. Each tire is assigned a randomly generated secret key, and the initial
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ID is set at 0x00000001.
Table 2. Example ID hopping based on Simon protocol
Tire: Left Front Right Front Left Rear Right Rear
Secret Key: 0x1e69817e96552645 0x0d5642034fc6feac 0x743e4bc52d349a51 0x564c4ac4314e3c5a
Round 0 0x00000001 0x00000001 0x00000001 0x00000001
Round 1 0xf21ae8fa 0x6ba0c094 0x0ce07b83 0xb9f00520
Round 2 0x672bbfa5 0x5890f0cc 0x7589fc2e 0x7e7c1540
Round 3 0x9cb82f3b 0x39edf661 0x95d9e232 0x29da9a76
Round 4 0x44518033 0x5808aa81 0xcff832cc 0x06daf377
Round 5 0xc2883e72 0xfea4c40d 0x8e489cbf 0x9f929b62
The ID from the last round, along with the secret key, is used as the input to generate
the next ID. In the presence of many moving vehicles, an eavesdropper would no longer
be able to easily associate tires (pseudo-IDs) with a vehicle, as the ID changes with
every transmission.
Sensor-Receiver Synchronization.
One issue that can arise from hopping pseudo-IDs is the handling of tire association
from an untrusted state. The system proposed here solves this by implementing a
simple detection algorithm to receive and check the authenticity of packets without
requiring the TPMS sensors to receive any data from the vehicle. At startup, the
receiver would have an empty packet buffer and not yet trust any sensors. As TPMS
data packets are received, either due to a low frequency activation signal from the
vehicle or as a part of normal operation, these packets are buffered. The receiver,
knowing the secret keys for each of its tires, can calculate the next N expected pseudo-
IDs as a function of the packet’s pseudo-ID and the four registered secret keys. After
receiving a predetermined number of packets matching the expected sequence, that
tire would be considered synchronized with the receiver. Figure 4 demonstrates an
example where an untrusted packet arrives, and the receiver calculates the next 5
expected ID’s for each tire. The sequences are calculated with the Simon protocol
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as described in section 3.1.3. The central buffer shows received packets, which arrive
from multiple tires that may be registered to the vehicle. A comparison of the buffer
and the expected IDs shows that the Right Front tire is transmitting an expected
sequence of ID’s, and could be considered synchronized.
Figure 4. Example of Tire Resynchronization Based on Expected ID Sequence
Note that in this figure, the IDs listed under each tire are the expected sequence
based on the untrusted packet shown at the top. Because the receiver does not know
which tire the packet belongs to, it generates a potential sequence using every tire’s
secret key, knowing that most of those sequences will be discarded. Only one (or none,
if the packet is from an external source) of the sequences will match, in this case the
Right Front tire. The unmatched packets in the buffer represent real received packets,
that belong to the other tires, and would have their own synchronization process.
This process would be followed for every untrusted packet that arrives, which is not
frequent in normal operation. If a matching sequence does not arrive in time, the
vehicle could send activation signals to stimulate a “quick sync”, causing the sensor
to send multiple packets within seconds, rather than the minutes it would normally
take. If this is unsuccessful, the receiver could enter a failure state and alert the driver
via the dashboard warning light.
21
The resilience of this system to packet loss and spoofing attacks is a trade space
based on the receiver memory and antenna placement. The existing system has no
concept of packet sequence, so as long as packets arrive frequently enough for the
sensor to be considered responsive, there are no issues with lost packets. If the
synchronization algorithm only calculated the next expected ID, a packet loss could
cause the receiver to lose trust in a sensor. Calculating the next N expected ID’s adds
resilience by allowing N-1 sequential packets to be lost without desynchronizing.
The number and location of antennae also affect the difficulty of tire association
and signal interference. If the vehicle has one receiving antenna per tire, it can be
calibrated such that interference from other tires on the vehicle and other vehicles on
the road is unlikely, also saving power on the sensor transmissions. A central receiving
antenna would save on material cost but suffer from potential packet collisions, and
the control unit would have to distinguish between packets coming from all 4 tires
into a single buffer.
Under normal operation, packets are infrequent such that even a small buffer
could hold enough packets to maintain synchronization and handle packet loss. For
example, if the receiver calculates the next 5 expected packet ID’s, for each incoming
packet it compares the ID to the list of expected ID’s for each tire. If it matches,
then that packet is parsed for the matched tire. A packet that does not align with
any expected sequence could be thrown out until a tire is considered out-of-sync, at
which point untrusted packets are used to calculate expected sequences to attempt
to resynchronize. This creates a new vulnerability arising when a large number of
packets are spoofed to fill this buffer and prevent synchronization, to be discussed in
later sections.
A simplified version of this TORI receiver was implemented in software to demon-
strate viability. Four tires and a central receiver were modelled. Each tire was given
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a unique secret key, known to the receiver as well. The tires generated packets every
90 seconds, rolling their ID according to the SIMON cipher with each transmission.
Every second of simulation has a pre-determined chance of packet injection (with
a random ID), and a pre-determined chance of starting an emergency condition on
a tire. When in an emergency state, the tire transmits every five seconds for one
minute, then clears the emergency (unless an emergency was reissued, which resets
the 60 second timer). These timestamped packets are fed into a receiver program,
which maintains separate buffers for each tire. When a packet arrives, it is immedi-
ately compared to the Expected ID buffer for each tire. If there is a match, the packet
is accepted by that tire. If there is no match and all tires are considered in sync, the
packet is discarded. If any tires are not in sync, it is placed in that tire’s buffer
and marked as suspicious. The next five expected IDs for that suspicious packet are
stored. If a later packet arrives that matches that sequence, that suspicious packet
is accepted and the new packet, and the tire is considered in sync. Sync is lost when
no new packets have arrived in two cycles, 180 seconds.
The implementation described here is not considered complete or ideal. It does
demonstrate feasibility, and provided initial insight into how one may design a re-
ceiver in the future. The most difficult problem for the tires was achieving first sync.
Lengthy time between packets and high packet loss conditions made receiving two
consecutive packets difficult, so achieving first sync and recovering from a desync are
problems to consider. Once synced, the rejection of unexpected packets presented
strong resilience to packet injection. If a tire is not synced, however, these erroneous
packets will be kept in the suspicious buffer. This presents a memory-performance
tradespace, where keeping more suspicious packets allows for more resilience to packet
injection while desynchronized. The number of IDs calculated ahead (five in the
proof-of-concept implementation) is related to resilience to packet loss. Under nor-
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mal conditions a tire receiver will time out before missing five packets, but if the
transmission frequency were increased (as in an emergency) and packet loss is high,
it is possible that the sequence will roll ahead past the Expected IDs buffer. The
memory requirements still remain low, so a relatively large amount of memory could
be allocated to these buffers to make such a case very unlikely.
3.4 Simulation Construction
Traffic Simulation.
Demonstrating the feasibility of tracking via TPMS data requires a large sample
set of realistic vehicles and driving patterns. Physical deployment would require a
large investment of resources to develop and deploy detectors, and would require the
collaboration of several parties over a lengthy period of time to complete. Employing
a simulator shifts the power into the hands of the researcher, and allows for control
over nearly every detail, along with the ability to rapidly change conditions and run
many trials. There are two general types of simulators considered for this. The first
are microscopic simulators, where the level of simulation goes down to individual
vehicles and lanes, acting on their own and responding in a realistic manner. In
contrast, macroscopic simulators abstract the individual vehicles into a general traffic
flow in a section of a map. To meet the goals of this research, a simulator was needed
that was intuitive, realistic, had a variety of maps available, and could be used to
generate TPMS data.
Simulator for Urban MObility (SUMO).
SUMO is an open source traffic simulation suite that provides several tools for
map and traffic generation, manipulation, and simulation. First released in 2002, it
continues to be actively developed, providing a platform to test routing protocols,
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run traffic congestion models, and generate realistic traffic data that can be used for
further research [25]. Maps are modeled as nodes and edges mapped to a Cartesian
grid, and can be constructed, randomly generated, or imported from other sources
such as OpenStreetMap [26]. Traffic conditions such as the number of lanes, traffic
light timings, speed restrictions, and more can all be specified or imported. Vehicles
can belong to standard classes such as car, truck, or bus, or customized to meet the
needs of the simulation. Simulations are defined by the map and route files. The map
establishes the places a vehicle may travel, along with road conditions and restrictions,
while the route defines the points at which a vehicle enters and exits the roadway,
which roads it travels on, and how it behaves during the trip. The simulation can
be modified while online using the Traffic Control Interface (TraCI) to observe how
changing conditions such as traffic lights or a collision may affect the simulation.
Map.
The map used for simulation is a section of the downtown Dayton, OH area.
SUMO includes a tool to use OpenStreetMap data to download real data for an
area, such that it accurately represents the traffic lights, speed limits, one-ways, and
other elements of traffic flow. The size of the map is a simulation parameter that
may be adjusted to serve different purposes; the chosen size was approximately 600
nodes and 1200 edges. This map was selected for the sake of familiarity and as
a representational map, with sufficiently diverse traffic conditions to demonstrate
feasibility. Urban deployment with a relatively high density of intersections was of
particular interest in this study. The selected map of Dayton is shown in Figure 5
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Figure 5. Map of Downtown Dayton in SUMO
Traffic Generation.
To generate traffic, the randomTrips SUMO Python script utilizes the network
description, simulation time, optional seed, and traffic density to generate an XML
trip file describing every vehicle created and its source node and destination node. The
SUMO tool DUAROUTER then converts these source/destination pairs into actual
routes that describe what roads the vehicle will attempt to take during simulation.
Wireless Detection.
SUMO includes a package for wireless communication which can be manipulated
to model various technologies such as Bluetooth and Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANET) [10]. Vehicles can be given receivers and transmitters independently, and
assignment can be done explicitly or randomly with a provided percentage. For
these experiments, 100% of vehicles had transmitters, representing the vehicles be-
ing equipped with tire pressure sensors. TPMS detectors are modeled as vehicles,
equipped with receivers, which park alongside the road at every intersection, as shown
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in Figure 6. Edge cases in which multiple intersections were very close to each other
were handled by manually removing overlapping detectors. When a vehicle enters
the detector’s range, it is recorded in an XML file at the end of simulation that de-
scribes a large amount of detail about the vehicle’s identity and travel conditions,
which are used later to compare the algorithm results to the baseline truth provided
by the simulation. At this stage, the density of detector deployment can be altered
by optionally eliminating a percentage of detectors.
Figure 6. Detector Vehicle (Magenta) Parked At Intersection
This method of modeling the wireless detectors is not a perfect representation of
how real detectors would be deployed, but provides sufficient fidelity to achieve the
research goals. A real detector would likely be a directional antenna which would
only receive data from a few lanes, possibly requiring 2n detectors for an n-way inter-
section. This could actually improve tracking algorithms by giving travel direction,
but for this simulation only binary detections are considered at intersections: Was a
vehicle present at this intersection, and at what time? Based on previous research,
and working within time constraints, this is a feasible type of input for later associa-
tion and tracking stages. An additional benefit of this approach is that timestamped
vehicle position data could come from detectors other than TPMS, which is particu-
larly of interest as VANET technologies evolve, but can be applied to existing systems
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such as Automatic Number Plate Readers.
SUMO generates wireless observation data, after which post-processing converts
this data into TPMS packets provided to the Tire ID Associator. In this post-
processing step, most of the data is stripped so that later stages do not have access
to insider information, such as the true vehicle ID, speed, or route. This stage begins
with a dictionary containing the time and location data for all wireless observations,
indexed by the observed vehicle ID. For each unique vehicle, four random 32-bit Tire
IDs are generated. At each observation for that vehicle, the simulation must decide
which tires would have been observed. Based on past experiments involving a direc-
tional antenna and measuring the attenuation due to a vehicle, a simple probabilistic
model was assumed as follows. The transmission from the two tires nearest a road-
side detector would always be received, (i.e., Right Side tires are always received),
and the Left Front and Left Rear tires are detected with a 50% and 10% probability,
respectively. These percentages are derived from the signal strengths observed in the
eavesdropping range experiments in [7]. Future work includes a more detailed mod-
eling scheme that incorporates directional antennas and speed of travel for a more
accurate representation. If a tire is considered to be detected at an observation point,
then that location and timestamp is placed into a new dictionary indexed by tire ID,
such that the resulting data structure no longer contains the true vehicle ID, and is
at most 4x larger than the original.
3.5 Experimental Metrics
This thesis introduces possible algorithms to identify vehicles and reconstruct their
routes. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these algorithms, metrics comparing
the results of these algorithms with truth data from the simulation are needed. Note
that these metrics are intended to have value across simulations, to form a relative
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sense of “goodness” for various configurations, but do not map to any external met-
rics. The performance of the algorithms in this document will be evaluated using
metrics particularly suited for the data they operate on. Data from the simulation
phase flows first into the Associator, which transforms TPMS observations into ve-
hicle identities. Those identities and associated observations are sent to the Route
Reconstruction phase, which transforms individual observations into complete routes.
The two metrics used here are Jaccard distance for the Tire ID Association phase,
and Graph Edit Distance for the Route Reconstruction phase.
Jaccard Distance.
The Tire ID Association phase relies on comparing sets to determine which com-
binations of IDs are commonly found with one another. Jaccard distance is a set
similarity metric that is commonly used for spell checking on strings [11]. It is de-
fined as
JaccardDistance(A,B) = (|A∩B|)
(|A∪B|)
The Jaccard distance can be used to compare a proposed set of Tire IDs with those
observed within a time window at a specific intersection along a route. For example, if
the proposed set is (0xa1, 0xb2, 0xc3) and all the IDs observed in a 5 second window at
an intersection form the set (0xcc, 0xdd, 0xff, 0xa1, 0xb2), then the Jaccard distance
can be calculated as:
|0xa1,0xb2|
(|0xa1,0xb2,0xc3,0xcc,0xdd,0xff |) =
2
6
= 0.33¯
This score has value in determining the best grouping of Tire IDs, which will be used
in Section 3.6. It is also used as an evaluation metric for final identities produced
by the Associator, by measuring the distance between a proposed identity and the
closest true identity. Note that the discrete values possible vary based on how many
tires the algorithm has grouped together, and how many tires a vehicle may have.
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Graph Edit Distance.
Graph edit distance is a method for comparing the similarity between two graphs,
useful for pattern matching [27]. It can be defined as the minimum number of mod-
ifications required to transform one graph into a target graph. These modifications
can take the form of insertions, deletions, or substitutions, on nodes or edges. Each
can be weighted differently to reflect the impact an operation would have, but in this
usage insertions and deletions are weighted as a cost of one, and substitutions are
weighted at two (representing one deletion and one insertion).
Figure 7. Graph Edit Distance Example
Figure 7 illustrates the conversion of one graph to another, with an edit distance
of five. Dashed lines represent deletions, of which there are three. Node D and edge
C-D are insertions, represented in bold, incurring a cost of two, for a total cost of
five.
A weakness of graph edit distance in this application is that it does not account
for the length of the road. Therefore, a different metric would need to be used to
answer questions such as ”What percentage of the route is the vehicle accounted for?”
One manipulation of graph edit distance that helps to account for this is the Edits
Per Node Travelled Ratio, which is used in Chapter IV. It represents the Graph Edit
Distance between the real route and predicted route, divided by the number of nodes
in the real route. It aids in predicting how many mistakes the algorithm will make
based on the length of a vehicle’s route, and removes some bias in experiments where
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the routes may have been longer.
3.6 Tire ID Association
Grouping Algorithm.
The next step in the pipeline is to attempt to associate the observed tire IDs with
one another, forming a tuple that ideally belongs to one vehicle. Each tire ID has an
associated list of observations, forming a route. Due to the improbability of getting all
four tires at every intersection, tire IDs that belong with each other (are from the same
car) will have similar, but not identical lists of observations. All tire IDs observed
within a specified time window (chosen as one second in these experiments), and at
a specified location are examined. For every tire ID, the frequency that each other
tire ID was observed ”near” the selected one are tallied across the entire observed
route. Because two cars may be near enough to overlap tire IDs, it is expected that
the algorithm will have to filter tire IDs from nearby vehicles, arising from a noisier
environment as traffic density increases. This filtering occurs in the next stage of
association.
All combinations of the four most frequently observed tire IDs, in relation to
the one being evaluated, are then compared with the sets observed at each loca-
tion using Jaccard Distance. The set with the highest average Jaccard Distance
across the route is considered to be an identity, and is saved in a scoring matrix.
The purpose of this is twofold; first, it allows for a tunable metric to be used to
manipulate the risk/reward of associating more tires. Secondly, because the route
for tires may appear different even if they belong to the same vehicle, it is pos-
sible that a sparsely observed tire appears to be associated with a different set
of tires. The scoring matrix adds a second layer of filtering to reduce that error.
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Input: Dictionary Obsin, containing a location-timestamp list of observations
indexed by Tire ID
Output: Dictionary Dout, containing a location-timestamp list of observations
indexed by vehicle ID
Initialization:
scoreMatrix=2-D array indexed by all observed Tire IDs, initialized to 0
vehNumber = 0
for id in Obsin do
associated = []
for (loc,time) in Obsin[id] do
Add nearby Tire IDs to associated
end
tireSet = id+three most frequent Tire IDs in associated
x = Combinations(tireSet)1
bestSet = Jaccard(x,Obsin[id])2
for tID in bestSet do
for tID2 in tireSet do
scoreMatrix[tID][tID2] += 1
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Association Algorithm: Initial Association
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for id in scoreMatrix do
confirmed = [id]
proposed = id+three most frequent IDs in scoreMatrix[id]
for idprop in proposed do
related = three most frequent IDs in scoreMatrix[idprop]
if id in related then
append idprop to confirmed
end
end
Dout[vehNumber] = MergeObservations(confirmed)
vehNumber += 1
for IDused in confirmed do
Delete IDused from scoreMatrix
end
end
1: All combinations of size 1,2,3 or 4 including id
2: Returns set with highest average Jaccard Similarity along id’s route
Algorithm 2: Association Algorithm: Final Association
After all tire IDs have been considered independently, the scoring matrix is evaluated
to form the final virtual vehicle identities; i.e., the set of tire IDs belonging to one
unique vehicle. If a set of tire IDs were consistently grouped into a set of four or less
with each other, those are proposed to be a specific vehicle and are removed from
further consideration. If the algorithm had attempted to group tire IDs such that
more than four appeared to be related, the four that were most frequently associated
with each other were taken as one vehicle.
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Scoring the Associator.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the Associator under various conditions, a scheme
was selected to satisfy a small number of principles. First, the tire IDs that the
algorithm grouped as a proposed vehicle should be evaluated with respect to each
other, rather than attempting to match them to a specific true vehicle, and second,
the risk and reward of attempting to add a third or fourth tire to a set should increase.
The method used to score the output of the Associator considers each set that was
grouped together, then performs a reverse lookup in the truth data to find which
true vehicle ID each tire ID was associated with. This creates a tuple of one to four
elements, each of which may correspond to the same vehicle or perhaps a different
vehicle. The most frequently occurring vehicle ID is used to score, by comparing the
set of predicted sensor IDs with that vehicle’s true set of IDs using Jaccard Similarity.
This produces a value ranging from 0.14 to 1 for four-wheeled vehicles, based on how
many correct and incorrect values were in the predicted set. This scoring system is
fully explained in Table 3.
Table 3. Possible Values for Scoring the Associator
# of Size of Notes Score
Matches Proposed Set
0 4 Four tires incorrectly associated - the Worst Case 1/6 = 0.14
0 3 Three separate tires incorrectly associated 1/7 = 0.17
0 2 Two tires incorrectly associated with each other 1/5 = 0.2
0 1 A single associated tire is effectively no association 1/4 = 0.25
1 4 One correct pair and two unrelated tires 2/6 = 0.3¯
1 3 One correct pair and a third misidentified tire 2/5 = 0.4
1 2 Two tires correctly associated with each other 2/4 = 0.5
2 4 Three tires that belong together and a fourth misidentified tire 3/5 = 0.6
2 3 Three tires correctly associated 3/4 = 0.75
3 4 Four tires correctly associated - the Ideal Case 4/4 = 1
A score of 0 is not possible because the algorithm does not generate identities for
empty sets. The minimum value possible is related to the number of tires a vehicle
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may have. Future iterations that are able to account for vehicles with more than
four TPMS-equipped tires would have more possible values, and the minimum value
would follow the equation for n tires: 1
2n−1 . Evidence of this decreasing score appears
as a practical reality in the TORI experiments, where a single vehicle has dozens of
IDs associated with its identity, driving the minimum score to a far lower possible
value.
3.7 Route Reconstruction
Algorithm.
The output from the Associator phase, and input to the Route Reconstruction
phase, is a list of proposed vehicles and their associated observations, which are
timestamped locations. The algorithm assumes full knowledge of the roads in the ge-
ographic area where detectors are placed, and this map is stored as a graph in which
roads are edges and intersections are nodes. The edges are weighted based on the
estimated travel time to traverse that edge. Each vehicle’s observations are examined
in order, and the algorithm attempts to predict the most likely route between obser-
vations for a given vehicle. To accomplish this, it takes two consecutive observations
and finds the simple path (no loops) whose estimated travel time most resembles the
difference in time between the points. This is repeated between all observations for
a vehicle, such that a list of sparse observations becomes a complete route with no
gaps. This entire process is repeated until proposed routes have been generated for
all proposed vehicles. An overview of the algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.
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Input:
Groads = graph structure of roads
vehicles = sparse observations (timestamped locations) indexed by vehicle ID
Output:
vehicles is updated to contain full vehicle paths
for each path p in vehicles do
pfull = Empty Graph
for Observation xi in p do
Add xi,loc to fullpath
if xi+1 exists then
elapsed = xi+1,time - xi,time
pathspossible = SimplePaths(G, x1,loc, xi+1,loc)
pbest = NearestTime(pathsposible,elapsed)
Add pbest to pfull
else
break
end
end
Update p to pbest
end
Algorithm 3: Route Reconstruction Algorithm
Scoring.
Because the road network is modeled as a graph, a natural choice to quantify the
correctness is graph edit distance. The truth data is used to build a directed graph
containing only the nodes and edges actually traversed, which is then compared to
the graph constructed by the algorithm. Graph edit distance tallies up the minimum
number of insertions, deletions, or substitutions required to convert one graph to the
other. In this case, to evaluate the proposed routes of proposed vehicles to the true
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routes of true vehicles. These operations can be weighted differently to reflect the
cost that each one incurs. In this case, an insertion would mean that the algorithm
missed a node or edge, and a deletion means it incorrectly guessed that a vehicle
visited a node or edge.
3.8 Experiment Factors
To evaluate the tracking pipeline under different conditions, the sensor density
and vehicle density are varied across simulations. Low, Medium, and High sensor
density, corresponding to detectors placed at 10%, 50%, or 100% of intersections,
will provide insight into the optimal number of sensors that should be placed when
cost or infrastructure would be a consideration. Vehicle density is likewise set to
Low, Medium, or High, corresponding to 200, 500, or 2000 vehicles in the simulation.
These were manually determined based on how much traffic the map could reasonably
contain without becoming overwhelmingly gridlocked. The Low Traffic Density is the
lowest number of vehicles that still ensures that most of the map will be used. The
Moderate setting was determined by the largest number of vehicles that would not
add extra travel delays. The High Traffic Density setting is set as the largest number
of vehicles the simulation can handle without experiencing total gridlock. These
settings provide sufficiently differing driving conditions to test the algorithms used
for tracking.
Each of the nine experiments was run with 30 unique seeds on the Route Recon-
structor, varying the exact routes and detector placement while keeping the densities
the same, while the Associator and TORI Associator were tested with 150 unique
seeds per experiment due to less processing constraints. In the TORI Variable Preva-
lence experiments, vehicles were also assigned TORI technology with a probability
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ranging from 0-100% in 10% increments. That set of experiments were run with 25
unique seeds per experiment per prevalence. In the TORI experiments, for each of
the nine simulation conditions. This reduction in seeds saved processing time, due to
the tenfold increase in experiments that varying prevalence introduces.
3.9 Tracking Via Sensor Data
The existing problem that currently enables tracking via TPMS is the exposed,
and unchanging, sensor IDs. The solution proposed in this document is primarily
concerned with changing these IDs in some form of hopping sequence, while leaving
the remainder of a packet unmodified to reduce potential costs and allow for more
compatibility with existing systems such as typical shop tire readers. However, with
more sophisticated algorithms it could be feasible to use the temperature and pres-
sure data to create identities, and then routes, for vehicles. This can be solved by
obfuscating this data, but it warrants investigation to discover how necessary such a
modification would be. In [7] the authors calculated the likelihood of two or more
cars having the same set of tire pressure IDs using the birthday problem calculation.
Assuming a uniform 28 bit ID-space, they calculated that it would require more than
1015 vehicles on the road to have greater than a 1% chance of ID-set collision. This
vast number, coupled with the fact that the vehicles would not be geographically co-
located, means that the sensor IDs are good candidates for identifying vehicles. The
inputs and assumptions to that calculation break down when considering the physical
sensor data, rather than the identifiers. The sensors do not transmit precise data,
and reserve a much smaller portion of the packet for the pressure and temperature
data. During initial experiments, it was discovered that the Toyota TPMS sensors
being tested reserved eight bits for the temperature and six bits for the pressure. This
reduces the space for identifying a vehicle from 28 bits to 14 bits per tire. This alone
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reduces the number of vehicles required for a data collision to
R =
√
257
4!
ln( 1
1−P )
In this scenario, the number of vehicles required for a 1% chance of data collision
is roughly eight million. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that dur-
ing normal operation, only a small range actually varies, so the assumption of equal
distribution is violated. The Toyota sensors encoded the data as integers with no
decimal precision, in Celsius for temperature and psi for pressure. The only modifi-
cation made to that data was to shift it so that negative values would not need to
be considered. TPMS typically will not warn a driver unless a tire more than 25%
different than specified by the manufacturer, so for a recommended pressure of 35
psi, it could go nine psi in either direction and still be within bounds. The typical
values could then only have the entropy of five bits, versus the full six. Based on the
results of [28], a temperature variation of 40◦C or less during operation in an urban
environment is reasonable. This reduces the entropy of the temperature field from 8
bits to 6 bits. The number of vehicles required for a data collision now becomes
R =
√
245
4!
ln( 1
1−P )
which places the number of cars required for a 1% expected chance of collision on
the order of 100,000 vehicles. This begins to cast doubt on the efficacy of tracking
in congested environments using the pressure and temperature data available in the
clear. The formulation here is optimistic for the attacker (getting data from all four
tires is unlikely, and the true range of pressure and temperature is likely smaller
in practice) and demonstrates that associating tires with identities using the sensor
data alone becomes increasingly difficult as traffic density increases. The options,
then, are to use more data to identify a vehicle, or shrink the effective traffic density
by placing more sensors such that a smaller geographic area can be considered when
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combined with time data. It seems reasonable to conclude that the cost to an attacker
is significantly increased by rendering the sensor IDs unusable, even if the sensor data
is left unchanged, i.e., non-obfuscated.
3.10 TORI Experiment
A full implementation of TORI is not undertaken in the scope of this thesis; but
with the infrastructure for the TPMS association constructed, it is straightforward to
demonstrate the effectiveness of an ID hopping scheme. The post-processing step that
generates TPMS packets is modified for these experiments such that every observation
for a tire rolls the ID using SIMON, with the sensor’s 64 bit secret key and the previous
ID as input to generate a new 32 bit ID. These packets are then fed into the Associator
created for the current generation of TPMS. This was expected to have a dramatic
negative impact on the average scores for the Associator. This is due, in part, to
some assumptions that are built in to the algorithm, but also to the greatly increased
difficulty of association with hopping IDs. The goal of this subset of experiments
is to show how the problem of association becomes significantly harder when basic
security features are implemented.
The score is calculated using Jaccard Distance, but the sets that are compared
are slightly modified. The proposed identity set is compared to the true vehicle’s set
of all IDs that were used in the simulation. The simulation conditions are for active
collection, which stimulates packet transmission, and every transmission creates a new
ID. Each tire then has at least as many associated IDs as observations, leading to
potentially large sets of IDs being associated with one vehicle when including all four
tires. The experiments were run with the Low, Moderate, and High Traffic Density
and Low, Moderate, and High Detector Density conditions (nine combinations total)
and 150 seeds per experiment. The results of these experiments are presented in
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Chapter IV.
TPMS Collisions.
The potential exists, particularly in TORI, for sensors to transmit the same ID.
If the devices transmit compatible packets, this is essentially an accidental spoofing
attack. The impact of this varies depending on which type of device is transmitting
and receiving the packet. These possible combinations are explored in the following
sections.
Static-TPMS collision with Static-TPMS.
It is possible, though unlikely, for modern-day Static TPMS devices to transmit
the same ID. Sensors from different manufacturers use differing frequencies, encoding
schemes and packet structure, and even if those conditions were equivalent, there
is enough ID space that a manufacturer can ensure that collisions do not naturally
occur. It is certainly possible to generate a collision with spoofing, so the handling
of a collision is still important with Static TPMS.
Rouf et al. tested how a vehicle reacted to spoofed packets. On their test vehicle,
multiple error packets, spaced at least 225 ms apart and less than 4 seconds apart,
were required to illuminate a warning light [7]. Additionally, once one error packet was
detected, the vehicle sent activation signals to trigger more packets from that tire’s
sensor. They discovered that as long as at least one error packet was sent within
a certain window, it didn’t matter how many non-error packets were received. The
timing constraints were relatively strict, however, such that natural collisions (such
as those from nearby vehicles) are unlikely to have an impact, unless the activation
signal also reached the colliding vehicle. Different manufacturers and models surely
have different schemes and windows for dealing with these issues, but the lesson is
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that single error packets can already be handled in the current generation of TPMS,
so unintentional collisions are not currently a concern.
TORI collision with Static TPMS.
If the rolling ID for a TORI device collides with a compatible Static TPMS device,
the receiver for the Static TPMS vehicle will most likely discard the single packet,
based on the work in [7]. Even if the vehicles are travelling closely, the next trans-
mission of the TORI device will use a different ID, such that a collision is no longer
present. The worst-case scenario is that the Static TPMS receiver accepts the single
packet, with an impact of displaying erroneous data for up to two minutes.
Static-TPMS collision with TORI.
Suppose a vehicle equipped with TORI is driving near a vehicle with Static TPMS
devices, and one of those devices transmits a compatible packet with an ID that
matches the next expected ID in the rolling sequence. The receiver for the TORI
vehicle will accept that packet as valid, but there is no potential for serious impact.
As long as the TORI receiver requires multiple error packets to display a warning to
the driver, there are no adverse effects except for the rejection of the forthcoming,
valid packet. Filtering based on expected timing, received signal strength, or utilizing
directional information from multiple antennas could alleviate this issue.
TORI collision with TORI.
TORI always has the potential for a collision when within range of other devices.
This is very unlikely in a 32 bit space with low transmission power, as referenced in
Section 2.3, and still unlikely even if ID space were reduced. The effect is essentially
the same as when a Static TPMS device collides with a TORI expected ID. Because
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they are transmitting a different sequence, only the one packet will have a valid ID.
Multiple warning packets are required to warn the driver, and non-critical data will
either be ignored, averaged in with the recent valid packets, or at worst, displayed
until the next valid packet arrives. A vehicle’s own registered tires may even transmit
colliding IDs, though this would be trivial to predict and detect within the receiver.
3.11 Summary
This chapter established the simulation setup and test methodology for the vehicle
tracking experiments, and described an implementation of TORI. Using the features
built into SUMO allows for rapid prototyping, upon which TPMS post-processing
scripts were added to convert the data to a usable format. An Association algorithm
was introduced to match individual TPMS packets from individual tires into a single
vehicle identity, which the Route Reconstruction algorithm can turn into full paths
for a vehicle, modelling the map and routes as a graph data structure.
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IV. Results & Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents analysis of the results of the experiment designed to exam-
ine the ability to track vehicles using Static TPMS. Those results are then presented
in comparison to evaluate the effectiveness of Tire Obfuscation through Rolling ID
(TORI), described in Chapter III. The first section analyzes the feasibility of track-
ing via Static TPMS. It is further divided into simulation results of the association
phase and the route reconstruction phase. The next section investigates how vehicles
equipped with TORI perform in the association phase of tracking. It is also evaluated
on how it would perform against potential attacks that have been demonstrated or
theorized against Static TPMS systems. The final set of experiments present results
on the effects of combining Static TPMS vehicles and TORI vehicles, to examine the
potential impact of a gradual rollout of this new technology.
4.2 Static TPMS Experimental Results
The variables changed between experiments are traffic and detector densities.
These are set at Low, Medium, or High as discussed in Section 3.8.
Associator Results.
This section examines the results of testing the Associator. Recall that Jaccard
distance provides a metric for the difference between the virtual identity proposed
by the algorithm, and the true identity from the simulation. Because only vehicles
with four tires are considered, there is a discrete number of possible values. These
described in the case of four tires in Chapter III.
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Figure 8 presents the boxplots of each experimental condition, when run with 150
seeds. Trends are apparent when grouping the results by traffic density, which is
how the remainder of the section will be organized. The horizontal axis categorizes
each experiment by Traffic Density and Detector Density. The vertical axis ranges
from zero to one and represents the Jaccard Distance across that set of experiments.
Higher values are better, with one being the ideal case.
Figure 8. Associator Results - Static TPMS - All Experiments
Triangles represent the mean of the data, and outliers are drawn as circles. The
median is represented as a red horizontal line, which always overlaps a quartile bound-
ary due to the discrete number of values possible. This figure shows an overview of
the trends across every experimental condition. Increasing the number of detectors
always improves the mean score, however the amount by which it increases is not
constant. The Low detector density experiments have a very similar average, regard-
less of Traffic Density, but the range of scores gets wider in the High Traffic Density
experiment. The efficacy of adding detectors is reduced as Traffic Density increases,
demonstrating a diminishing returns effect and hinting at a critical point in Traffic
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Density that could allow for optimizations for a known set of traffic conditions. This
data is explained in deeper detail in the following sections.
Low Traffic Density.
Low traffic density presents the most ideal conditions for the Associator to work.
In the most simple case, a single vehicle could always be correctly associated because
it would not require distinguishing between vehicles. It also presents the largest gains
when increasing the number of detectors. Figure 9 charts the distribution of scores
for each of the Low Traffic Density conditions. These experiments were run with 200
vehicles injected into the simulation over 200 seconds.
Figure 9. Low Traffic Density Associator Score Distribution
Note that the distribution for each Detector Density does not have a continuous
shape because certain values are less likely to be output. The algorithm is more
likely to select smaller, incomplete sets than to include tires that are less confidently
associated. This means that values such as 0.5 and 0.75 are more likely to occur
because they represent incomplete sets with no mismatches, versus a value such as
0.6, which has one mismatched tire. This is a form of risk aversion, and could be
adjusted by using different evaluation metrics when the algorithm is making decision.
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As detector density increases, the weight of the distribution rapidly shifts to the
right, as more perfect matches occur. This is also observable in the means of the
data, which aids in smoothing the discrete nature of scores. The mean values for this
data with a 95% confidence interval are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Mean Jaccard Distance for Low Traffic Density Associator Experiments
Detector Density Mean Jaccard Distance
Low 0.70 ± 0.0023
Moderate 0.85 ± 0.0017
High 0.91 ± 0.0015
There is a 0.15 increase between the Low Detector Density (10% intersection cov-
erage) to Moderate Detector Density (50% intersection coverage), and a 0.06 increase
between Moderate and High (100% coverage). The histogram plots show less varia-
tion as Detector Density increased, which is reflected here in the smaller confidence
interval with higher detector levels.
Moderate Traffic Density.
These experiments were conducted with 500 vehicles injected into the simulation
over 200 seconds. This represents over twice as many vehicles as the Low Traffic
Density experiment, but still allows for fairly normal traffic patterns. Figure 10
shows the distribution of scores across the Moderate Traffic Density Experiments.
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Figure 10. Moderate Traffic Density Associator Score Distribution
These graphs hold the same trend as before, with the distribution shifting to the
right as detector density increases. The mean values for this set of experiments with
a 95% confidence interval are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Mean Jaccard Distance for Moderate Traffic Density Associator Experiments
Detector Density Mean Jaccard Distance
Low 0.68 ± 0.0015
Moderate 0.82 ± 0.0013
High 0.90 ± 0.0011
In this set of experiments, the mean increased by 0.14 from Low to Moderate,
and 0.08 from the Moderate to High case, a slight improvement in efficacy over the
Low Traffic Density experiments. This is appears to start a slight trend, where as the
difficulty of the problem increases, there is more to be gained from adding detectors.
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High Traffic Density.
These experiments were run with 2000 vehicles injected into the simulation over
200 seconds. This created scenarios with occasional gridlock as the traffic system
attempted to cope with the large influx of vehicles. This helps to provide perspective
on how such a system would perform in periods of heavy traffic, such as rush hour
times or days of special events. Figure 11 shows the score distribution for this set of
experiments.
Figure 11. High Traffic Density Associator Score Distribution
The same trend as previous experiments is present, with higher scores appearing
more frequently as detector density increases, but the relation is not as strong as
before. This can be seen explicitly in the means in Table 6.
Table 6. Mean Jaccard Distance for High Traffic Density Associator Experiments
Detector Density Mean Jaccard Distance
Low 0.66 ± 0.00095
Moderate 0.76 ± 0.0011
High 0.82 ± 0.00064
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In this set of experiments the mean increased by 0.10 from Low to Moderate,
and 0.06 from Moderate to High. This has a lower impact in both cases than the
Moderate experiments, however it does demonstrate a slight increase in efficacy when
going from Moderate to High compared to the Low Traffic Density Experiments. This
points to there being an optimization problem to be explored in this data, testing
more Detector Densities to see where the optimal point is for different levels of Traffic
Density. This knowledge would allow someone wishing to implement a tracking system
to set a desired cost per improvement, and deploy the optimal number of sensors.
There are certain trends that span more than just the traffic densities. Increasing
detector density always improves the mean score, although the relative benefit of
adding more detectors is not equivalent at each traffic density. All experimental
conditions had cases where all four tires were correctly associated, which is to be
expected as long as the routes are long enough and there are opportunities to detect
all four tires. The minimum score present in the data was tied to traffic density
rather than detector density, where the worst cases get worse for a given detector
density when more cars are injected into the simulation. This is likely the result
of traffic congestion, which causes vehicles to group at intersections and effectively
form caravans. Caravans make association difficult, as multiple vehicles passing by a
detector in a short window increases the likelihood of an error.
Route Reconstruction Results.
This section presents the results of the route reconstruction experiments on Static
TPMS. The Route Reconstructor is scored based on the Graph Edit Distance between
the true route a vehicle traveled, and the estimated route generated by the algorithm.
Every node or edge that is inserted or deleted incurs a cost of one, such that a zero is a
perfect reconstruction. Note that because routes are random, the length of each route
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varies, and the number of nodes or edges traveled does not have a constant relation to
the physical distance traveled. As such, graph edit distance is used to observe trends
between experiments as a natural metric to use when the maps are modeled as directed
graphs. Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of scores for the Route Reconstructor.
Trends in route reconstruction emerge primarily as a function of detector density, as
expected. When detector density is high, some vehicle routes are perfectly recreated.
Under the conditions of low vehicle density and a high number of detectors, the
average score is the best of any of the experiments conducted. However, when vehicle
density is high, adding more detectors does not improve the average score.
It is plausible and intuitive to expect that the algorithm would reconstruct routes
with complete accuracy when 100% of intersections are monitored, as in the High
Detector Density case. This does not occur in practice for multiple reasons. First
is that the Route Reconstruction algorithm is not given knowledge of the detector
coverage; if provided, it could have heuristics to choose paths that are more likely.
Another factor is the imperfect reconstruction of identities and their routes from the
Association phase. Complete detector coverage still does not detect every single tire
at every intersection. When an identity was formed, it may have selected a subset
of tires that do not have a route that is completely covered, thus is functionally
equivalent to having a lower Detector Density. Finally, the metric used to decide
on the most likely path travelled between observations is expected travel time. The
farther actual travel times are from expected, the more errors that may be introduced,
so in heavily congested traffic the algorithm is prone to error. Future iterations of
this algorithm could use knowledge of the map and detector locations to inform the
decision points, and use a changing expected travel time metric that is updated to
reflect true conditions.
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Figure 12. Route Reconstructor Edit Distance All Experiments
Low Traffic Density.
This section presents the route reconstruction results for Low Traffic Density and
varying detector density. The mean values with 95% confidence intervals are presented
in Table 7.
Table 7. Mean Graph Edit Distance for Low Traffic Density Route Reconstruction
Experiments
Detector Density Mean Value
Low 36.93 ± 0.4941
Moderate 35.62 ± 0.5952
High 31.53 ± 0.6460
The trend across these experiments is a steadily decreasing average Graph Edit
Distance, improving by 3.55% from Low to Moderate and 11.5% from Moderate to
High. The confidence interval showed the most variability in the high case, but
remained under one edit in every case. Figures 13 show the distribution of scores in
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each experiment across several seeds. Figures 14 show the distribution of the Edits
Per Node Traveled Ratio in each experiment.
Figure 13. Low Traffic Density Graph Edit Distance Distribution
Figure 13 demonstrates the expected trend in the distribution of scores. Note that
lower Graph Edit Distance is better, denoting fewer differences between a proposed
and true vehicle route. With Low Detector Density, it shows a relatively Normal dis-
tribution centered around 30-45 edits. This distribution shifts to the left as Detector
Density increases, representing a higher percentage of reconstructed routes with a low
edit distance.
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Figure 14. Low Traffic Density Edit Ratio Distribution
Figure 14 shows the distribution of Edit Ratios for the Low Traffic Density ex-
periments. Recall that Edit Ratio represents the number of edits made to a route
divided by the total number of nodes traveled on the true route. This helps account
for long routes, where a higher number of absolute errors would be expected. The
ideal case is to score a zero, representing a perfectly reconstructed route. The Low
Detector Density experiment shows a strong peak centered around one to two edits
per node, but as Detector Density increases, the distribution flattens into a more
normal distribution and shifts left.
Moderate Traffic Density.
This section presents the route reconstruction results for Moderate Traffic Density
and varying detector density. The mean values with 95% confidence intervals are
presented in Table 8.
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Table 8. Mean Graph Edit Distance for Moderate Traffic Density Route Reconstruction
Experiments
Detector Density Mean Value
Low 37.17 ± 0.3211
Moderate 39.74 ± 0.4037
High 38.92 ± 0.4654
This set of experiments did not demonstrate a trend, increasing by 6.9% from Low
to Moderate, but decreasing 2.07% from Moderate to High. The confidence interval
did increase as the number of detectors increased, demonstrating increased variability.
This may point to an area for exploration, where there may be a critical point for
each Traffic Density where more detectors can actually hinder average accuracy.
Figure 15. Moderate Traffic Density Graph Edit Distance Distribution
Figure 15 shows the distribution of edit distance values for the Moderate Traffic
Density experiments. The Low Detector Density case shows a very similar distribution
to the Low/Low experiment, a normal distribution centered around 30-45 edits. It
also continues the trend of shifting the distribution left (improving in accuracy) as
Detector Density increases.
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Figure 16. Moderate Traffic Density Edit Ratio Distribution
Figure 16 shows the distribution of Edit Ratios for the Moderate Traffic Density
experiments. The Low Detector Density experiment shows a strong peak centered
around one to two edits per node, as was also observed in the Low/Low experiment.
Increasing the number of detectors reduces the peak and shifts the distribution to-
wards zero edits. Performance is diminished overall when compared to the Low Traffic
Density experiment, with no experiment having the lowest (best) bin contain the peak
frequency.
High Traffic Density.
This section presents the route reconstruction results for High Traffic Density
and varying detector density. The mean values with 95% confidence intervals are
presented in Table 9.
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Table 9. Mean Graph Edit Distance for High Traffic Density Route Reconstruction
Experiments
Detector Density Mean Value
Low 36.86 ± 0.1868
Moderate 42.18 ± 0.1904
High 45.27 ± 0.2087
The trend across these experiments is an increasing average edit distance, in-
creasing by 14.4% from Low to Moderate and 7.32% from Moderate to high. This
continues the trend from the Moderate Traffic Density experiment, with the Route
Reconstructor performing worse as the number of detectors increases. The confidence
interval remained under one in every case, and is more consistent than in the previ-
ous set of experiments. Figure 17 show the distribution of scores in each experiment
across several seeds. Figure 18 shows the distribution of the Edits Per Node traveled
Ratio in each experiment.
Figure 17. High Traffic Density Graph Edit Distance Distribution
Figure 17 shows the distribution of edit distance values for the High Traffic Den-
sity experiments. These did not demonstrate the same strong left shift as Detector
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Density increased, as was observed in the lower Traffic Density experiments. This
set of experiments showed a flattening effect, with the peaks getting weaker and the
distribution spreading. They are still heavy towards the left, demonstrating that
the algorithm is still producing better results with more detectors, but this effect is
not nearly as pronounced as the previous cases. This points to a scaling issue with
the simulation, detection or reconstruction, where there is a critical point in Traffic
Density where the efficacy of the algorithm decreases.
Figure 18. High Traffic Density Edit Ratio Distribution
Figure 18 shows the distribution of Edit Ratios for the High Traffic Density exper-
iments. The Low Detector Density experiment shows a strong peak centered around
one to two edits per node, as was also observed in the previous experiments. In-
creasing the number of detectors no longer improves the results as much as previous
experiments, still peaking at one to two edits per node but with more weight towards
the higher numbers at High Detector Density, representing worse performance.
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4.3 TORI
Associator Results.
An additional set of experiments were run to demonstrate how a security imple-
mentation that incorporates rolling tire IDs would disable the Associator that was
working effectively for Static TPMS. An overview of the statistical distribution over
150 seeds for each condition is shown in Figure 19. The horizontal lines that make up
each plot represent the minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum
(not including outliers). Outliers are plotted as circles, while the triangle represents
the mean for that experiment.
Figure 19. TORI Associator Results
As expected, the results are poor in comparison to Static TPMS results. Rolling
IDs dramatically reduce the effectiveness of an Associator designed for the static
TPMS devices, and would require more effort and more complex algorithms to as-
sociate, if possible at all. The means are nearly equal for a given detector density,
regardless of the traffic density. Outliers exist due to short vehicle routes, where a
vehicle may have been rarely observed, and therefore generated fewer IDs during the
simulation. The fewer IDs that belong to a true vehicle, the more opportunity exists
for a proposed identity to receive a high score. In these experiments, detector cov-
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erage is inversely related to the performance. This will be explored in greater detail
in the following sections, but appears to be due to the increase in IDs that belong
to a true vehicle as detectors stimulate more packets. Recall that this simulation is
for active detection, which stimulates the sensors to broadcast every time the vehicle
passes a detector. When a proposed identity is scored, that score is proportional to
how many IDs the algorithm correctly assigned to a vehicle, divided by the number
of IDs that actually belonged to the true vehicle. In the previous experiments, each
vehicle had four tire IDs assigned, so a perfect association would assign those four
tires to one identity, and score a perfect 1.0 using Jaccard Similarity. Using the same
system for scoring a TORI equipped vehicle is expected to generate a lower score in
nearly all cases, because even in a scenario in which four IDs were assigned an identity
and belonged to the same true vehicle, that vehicle could have dozens of IDs that
belong to it. Every detector it drives by adds two to four more IDs, depending on
how many sensors it stimulates. The end result is that the algorithm splits a single
vehicle into many low-scoring identities, and the more IDs a vehicle generates during
a trip, the lower those scores will be. Rolling IDs inject so much digital chaff into the
Associator that the overall score greatly suffers.
Low Traffic Density.
The mean results of TORI association during Low Traffic Density, with a 95%
confidence interval are shown in Table 10. The table also shows the percentage
change when compared to the same experiment conditions for Static TPMS. The
score distributions for this set of experiments are shown in Figure 20.
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Table 10. Mean Jaccard Distance for Low Traffic Density TORI Associator Experiments
Detector Density Mean Value
Reduction From
Static TPMS Experiment
Low 0.20 ±0.00090 71.5%
Moderate 0.081 ± 0.00022 90.4%
High 0.045 ± 0.000087 95.1%
The average score for the TORI association is reduced by 0.119 from Low to Mod-
erate, and by 0.036 from Moderate to High. The mean score trends towards zero as
detector density increases. Though Detector Density is at its functional maximum
on the High setting (100% intersection coverage), if more detectors were added, this
score could reasonably be expected to decrease even further. In a practical implemen-
tation adding detectors in areas besides intersections would only serve to gain higher
resolution for tracking vehicles between intersections. While beneficial for Static
TPMS, during active collection this triggers more TORI packets, in turn confusing
the Associator.
The “Reduction From Static TPMS Experiment” column of the table shows the
relative decrease in mean Jaccard Distance, when compared to the same experiment
conditions tested on Static TPMS vehicles. This set contains the largest score re-
duction of all TORI experiments, in the Low/High experiment, which received an
average score 95.1% lower than the experiments with the same conditions, but tested
on the insecure Static TPMS.
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Figure 20. Low Traffic Density TORI Associator Score Distribution
The Low Traffic Density experiment has a moderately spread distribution of
scores, which rapidly shifts towards zero as detector coverage increases. In the High
Detector Density experiment, over 90% of the proposed identities from the Associator
scored less than 0.1. This means that even with complete intersection coverage, which
should be the best case, over 90% of the identities covered less than 10% of the IDs
actually associated with a vehicle.
Moderate Traffic Density.
The mean results of TORI association during Moderate Traffic Density, with a
95% confidence interval are shown in Table 11. The table also shows the percentage
change when compared to the same experiment conditions for Static TPMS. The
score distributions for this set of experiments are shown in Figure 21.
62
Table 11. Mean Jaccard Distance for Moderate Traffic Density TORI Associator Ex-
periments
Detector Density Mean Value
Reduction From
Static TPMS Experiment
Low 0.20 ±0.00060 70.4%
Moderate 0.085 ± 0.00015 89.7%
High 0.047 ± 0.000060 94.7%
The data shows a sharp decrease when compared to the earlier Static TPMS
experiments, and rapidly decreasing as Detector Density increases. The average score
is reduced by 0.115 from Low to Moderate, and by 0.038 from Moderate to High.
These reductions are very similar to the Low Traffic Density experiment, showing
that scaling for the scores between experiments holds constant, at least for these
Traffic Densities.
Figure 21. Moderate Traffic Density TORI Associator Score Distribution
The Moderate Traffic Density experiment showed the same trends as the Low
Detector Density experiments, with a high percentage of the results being less than
0.1. The same summary statement applies to these Moderate experiments, as even
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at full intersection coverage, over 90% of the identities covered less than 10% of the
IDs actually associated with a vehicle.
High Traffic Density.
The results of TORI association during High Traffic Density are shown in Table
12. The score distributions for this set of experiments are shown in Figure 22.
Table 12. Mean Jaccard Distance for High Traffic Density TORI Associator Experi-
ments
Detector Density Mean Value
Reduction From
Static TPMS Experiment
Low 0.23 ±0.00043 65.9%
Moderate 0.11 ± 0.00014 85.1%
High 0.068 ± 0.000070 91.6%
This data also shows a dramatic drop in Associator Performance, worsening as de-
tector coverage increases. The average score is reduced by 0.12 from Low to Moderate
Detector Density, and by 0.042 from Moderate to High. These relative scores, while
significant, are not as high as the previous experiments. The comparison experiment
experienced similar diminishing returns, so this result is not surprising.
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Figure 22. High Traffic Density TORI Associator Score Distribution
The High Traffic Density experiment showed the same trends as the previous
experiments, shifting left as detector density increased. One trend to note across
experiments is that in the Moderate Detector Density is that as Traffic Density in-
creases, the weight of the distribution shifts towards 0.1. This may point to a critical
point Traffic and Detector Density where scores may be slightly improved, or the
rapid downward trend of the scores may slow. Though the shapes of the distribution
very closely resembles the previous experiments, the peak frequency gets lower as
Traffic Density increases, such that the scores do not decrease at the same rate or to
the same degree in High Traffic scenarios versus others.
Variable TORI Prevalence.
These experiments sought to examine how mixing TORI-equipped vehicles with
Static TPMS vehicles affects association of the Static TPMS vehicles. Experiments
were run for Low/Moderate/High Traffic Density, Low/Moderate/High Detector Den-
sity, and 0-100% TORI Prevalence in 10% increments. Each simulation condition was
executed with 25 different seeds and averaged. The individual scores were separated
based on whether they mapped to vehicles with TORI technology or not. The results
are grouped by Traffic Density, containing a table of the means in each experiment,
which is also graphed. Note that the line graphs remove the point that sits on the
65
x-axis for the sake of continuity, as these represent experiments with zero cars of that
particular TPMS technology.
Low Traffic Density.
This section presents the results for the Variable TORI Prevalence experiments
with Low Traffic Density. Table 13 presents the average means over 25 seeds for each
experimental condition, which are graphed in Figure 23.
Table 13. Low Traffic Density Variable TORI Prevalence Mean Associator Scores
Low
Detector Density
Moderate
Detector Density
High
Detector Density
Prevalence Static TPMS TORI Static TPMS TORI Static TPMS TORI
0 0.7065 0 0.8468 0 0.9170 0
0.1 0.7041 0.2116 0.8339 0.08472 0.8937 0.04924
0.2 0.7000 0.2103 0.8229 0.08520 0.8687 0.04821
0.3 0.7008 0.2105 0.8133 0.08495 0.8483 0.04791
0.4 0.6982 0.2067 0.8007 0.08375 0.8060 0.04769
0.5 0.6984 0.2064 0.7936 0.08354 0.7808 0.04736
0.6 0.6946 0.2043 0.7787 0.08317 0.7545 0.04675
0.7 0.6963 0.2035 0.7660 0.08296 0.7484 0.04632
0.8 0.7032 0.2034 0.7616 0.08250 0.7617 0.04584
0.9 0.7146 0.2020 0.7508 0.08214 0.7297 0.04508
1 0 0.2018 0 0.0817 0 0.04474
This set of experiments demonstrated a 1.1% increase, 11.3% decrease, and 20.4%
decrease in TPMS association averages for Low, Medium, and High Detector Density
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as TORI prevalence increased from 0 to 90% of the vehicles in the simulation. The
average score for TORI association held fairly constant within any simulation, but
as Detector Density increased that score dropped significantly. This is thought to be
the result of the detectors stimulating more packets from the TORI devices, which
causes scores to lower as the vehicle generates more IDs.
(a) Low/Low (b) Low/Mid (c) Low/High
Figure 23. Low Traffic Density TORI Associator Score Variable Prevalence Distribution
As expected from the results in Section 4.2, increasing detector coverage increases
the starting average for Static TPMS. The Low/Low experiment holds scores rela-
tively constant for any prevalence.
Moderate Traffic Density.
This section presents the results for the Variable TORI Prevalence experiments
with Moderate Traffic Density. Table 14 presents the average means over 25 seeds for
each experimental condition, which are graphed in Figure 24.
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Table 14. Moderate Traffic Density Variable TORI Prevalence Mean Associator Scores
Low
Detector Density
Moderate
Detector Density
High
Detector Density
Prevalence Static TPMS TORI Static TPMS TORI Static TPMS TORI
0 0.6904 0 0.8220 0 0.8954 0
0.1 0.6874 0.2123 0.8010 0.09097 0.8547 0.05176
0.2 0.6833 0.2119 0.7846 0.09095 0.8171 0.05024
0.3 0.6824 0.2112 0.7670 0.08988 0.7816 0.05059
0.4 0.6816 0.2089 0.7499 0.08848 0.7541 0.05057
0.5 0.6755 0.2079 0.7356 0.08804 0.7218 0.05005
0.6 0.6738 0.2073 0.7239 0.08733 0.6973 0.04960
0.7 0.6713 0.2063 0.7106 0.08678 0.6681 0.04922
0.8 0.6727 0.2054 0.6981 0.08603 0.6591 0.04856
0.9 0.6787 0.2047 0.6935 0.08537 0.6161 0.04792
1 0 0.2048 0 0.08497 0 0.04703
This Moderate Traffic Density experiments demonstrated a 1.7%, 15.6%, and
31.2% decrease in TPMS association averages for Low, Medium, and High Detector
Density as TORI prevalence increased from 0 to 90% of the vehicles in the simulation.
The same trend for the average TORI score as the Low Traffic Density experiments
was present, with the score staying constant for a given Detector Density but dropping
significantly as detector coverage increased. This data is shown graphically in Figure
24.
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(a) Mid/Low (b) Mid/Mid (c) Mid/High
Figure 24. Moderate Traffic Density TORI Associator Score Variable Prevalence Dis-
tribution
These graphs illustrate the trend of a steady TORI score within an experiment, de-
creasing as Detector Density increases. The slope of the Static TPMS score decreases
more rapidly in High Detector Density experiments, starting the highest score in this
set of experiments and ending with the lowest score for Moderate Traffic Density
Static TPMS.
High Traffic Density.
This section presents the results for the Variable TORI Prevalence experiments
with Low Traffic Density. Table 15 presents the average means over 25 seeds for each
experimental condition, which are graphed in Figure 25.
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Table 15. High Traffic Density Variable TORI Prevalence Mean Associator Scores
Low
Detector Density
Moderate
Detector Density
High
Detector Density
Prevalence Static TPMS TORI Static TPMS TORI Static TPMS TORI
0 0.6557 0 0.7558 0 0.8211 0
0.1 0.6533 0.2394 0.7396 0.1220 0.7827 0.07948
0.2 0.6499 0.2423 0.7225 0.1203 0.7460 0.07622
0.3 0.6464 0.2413 0.7059 0.1192 0.7165 0.07540
0.4 0.6439 0.2386 0.6911 0.1179 0.6866 0.07439
0.5 0.6403 0.2378 0.6767 0.1161 0.6654 0.07344
0.6 0.6413 0.2351 0.6622 0.1154 0.6373 0.07210
0.7 0.6392 0.2344 0.6535 0.1147 0.6124 0.07140
0.8 0.6374 0.2334 0.6430 0.1140 0.5990 0.07005
0.9 0.6433 0.2321 0.6305 0.1133 0.5783 0.06921
1 0 0.2317 0 0.1122 0 0.06801
These experiments demonstrated a 1.9% , 16.6%, and 29.6% decrease in TPMS
association averages for Low, Medium, and High Detector Density as TORI prevalence
increased from 0 to 90% of the vehicles in the simulation. These returns are similar
to those of the Moderate Traffic Density experiments, pointing towards a cap on the
returns of TORI with this infrastructure.
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(a) High/Low (b) High/Mid (c) High/High
Figure 25. High Traffic Density TORI Associator Score Variable Prevalence Distribu-
tion
The graphs again show a decreasing score for Static TPMS as TORI prevalence
increases, with the slope becoming steeper with higher Detector Density. This trend
was present for all Traffic Densities, and suggests that the more investment an eaves-
dropper puts in their infrastructure (deploying more detectors), the more potential
TORI has to spoil the gains. This has the dual effect of lowering the effectiveness
of eavesdropping and association in general, and requiring an increased effort that
makes TPMS a less appealing attack vector.
Route Reconstruction.
The ability of the Route Reconstruction algorithm to generate quality results is
highly dependent on the quality of the input. In the Static TPMS experiments, the
input was nearly perfect as most of the identities for vehicles had consistent and real-
istic paths. Even with this near-ideal input, the results of converting sparse detections
into complete paths had varying success. Integrating TORI into the simulation dra-
matically reduces the quality of the Associator data that would become the input to
the Route Reconstructor. As one would expect, most proposed identities only con-
tain one observation, from which a route cannot be constructed. Due to this, route
reconstruction experiments were not run for TORI-equippped vehicles.
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Resistance to Attack.
The purpose of this section is to note how TORI combats the attacks that work
against the existing system, and discuss potential attacks on the proposed system.
The goal of TORI was to significantly raise the bar of executing a successful attack
against the devices. Any security features that are implemented significantly improve
the difficulty of exploitation.
Denial of Service.
Denial of service is a threat in this space primarily because these devices exist
for the safety of drivers, so lack of access to that data is a risk. Simple jamming
of the frequency is trivial for all current systems, particularly because low power
transmission is part of the design, and is considered a separate problem domain. In the
proposed system, denial could potentially be achieved by filling the receiver’s packet
buffer with spoofed packets, such that it could never synchronize to the registered
tires. To thwart this, a packet filter could be implemented using a feature such as
signal strength, or dropping packets that don’t have an expected ID while the receiver
is in a trusted state with its sensors.
Spoofing.
TORI defeats the previous (trivial) methods of spoofing because an attacker can-
not predict what the next packet will be without the secret key. Even if the spoofer
happened to guess one correct ID, they would need to do so multiple times in the
proper sequence for the vehicle to accept the packets. The chances of this happening
are near-zero, and the difficulty can be increased by increasing the number of valid
packets required before they are considered trustworthy.
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Tracking.
The primary objective of this solution is to prevent tracking based on sensor ID’s
by changing the ID with every transmission. An eavesdropper without the secret
key cannot guess the next ID, so they must resort to other methods to utilize these
packets. It should be noted that it may be feasible to associate transmissions with
vehicles based on the data that is usually sent without any obfuscation. Variations
in sensors, tires, and vehicles could yield combinations of temperature and pressure
data that are unique enough to associate the combined data with a specific vehicle.
Under normal conditions, these should show little or predictable variance per tire.
Given enough readings, this data of generally low value could be used to reconstruct
that vehicle’s driven route. To reduce this attack surface without resorting to compu-
tationally expensive encryption, the data could be obfuscated based on the secret key
or sequence number, such that an eavesdropper could not easily determine the data
values to associate with an identity. This was discussed in greater detail in Section
3.9.
Replay attack.
Static TPMS sensors are vulnerable to a simple replay attack, where a single
packet could be recorded and rebroadcasted as often as an attacker wishes. Note that
the sophistication of a replay attack is not needed in Static TPMS implementations
because the attacker can craft any packet desired and the receiver will accept it,
provided the correct, and trivially acquired, ID is used. The solution proposed here
thwarts single-packet replay attacks by requiring a correct sequence of hopping ID’s
before the packets are trusted, therefore a single rebroadcast would not be trusted.
The core proposal would still be vulnerable to a replay attack of a lengthy sequence,
as it does not provide a way of knowing where in the hopping sequence the transmitter
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is, only if the future packets will be valid. This would be most dangerous when used
to hide a real problem, where a tire is put in a dangerous state but the replayed
packets are from a time period of normal operation.
This attack on TORI already requires much more difficulty than the existing sys-
tem, but can be alleviated in many ways. Including a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) that incorporates the secret key would prevent the data from being modi-
fied before transmission, lowering the impact of the attack at the cost of hardware
complexity and power usage. Sequence numbers can be used to cause the receiver to
reject the replayed packets. Consider a mode on the sensor where the low frequency
activation signal triggers the sensor to send a special packet containing an obfus-
cated sequence number, rather than sensor data. This would provide time-sensitive
shared secret to allow the receiver to distinguish between the true sender and a re-
played sequence, dramatically decreasing the potential for an attack to work. Such
a modification leverages the current low frequency signal as a side channel for extra
security.
4.4 Summary
The performance of the Associator and Route Reconstructor were tested under
nine experimental conditions and several seeds to examine the feasibility of tracking
via TPMS and how consistent the results are. The Associator performs well in most
cases, with the typical case correctly associating three tires with each other under
conservative conditions, and having a small variability. The Route Reconstructor
was evaluated based on how many errors were made in the graph reconstruction of
vehicles. In the Low Traffic Density experiments it performed well, with many cases
requiring minimal edits, but as traffic density increases the performance drops, and
it demonstrated a trend where increased detector density made performance worse.
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The proposal for TORI was evaluated in theoretical terms to see how it is affected
by the attacks to which the present-day Static TPMS devieces are vulnerable, and
contemplate potential new, albeit more difficult attacks. The security measures added
defeat most attacks, and the remaining attack such as an extended replay have lower
impact and higher cost than against the previous generation of TPMS.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
The absence of security features in TPMS presents an attack surface that could be
exploited by a moderately equipped attacker. This thesis showed the feasibility of one
such attack, a potential solution, and the need for further research and manufacturer
intervention before safety-critical flaws are discovered. This chapter summarizes the
goals of this research in Section 5.2, draws conclusions about the research in Section
5.3, summarizes the contributions to the area of research in Section 5.4, presents
avenues for future work in Section 5.5, and concludes with some final remarks in
Section 5.6.
5.2 Motivation and Research Goals
TPMS adoption is already widespread, but could benefit from a more secure
implementation. Given that these devices are mandated on most consumer vehicles,
and are therefore found in large numbers on our roadways (Critical Infrastructure),
they deserve a close examination. The goal of this research was to examine what
effects the lack of security in TPMS can have, and show the feasibility of one type
of attack in a large-scale environment. The results of this exploration could be used
to deploy a sensor network to leverage the exposed data, but could also be used to
secure the next generation of TPMS.
5.3 Conclusions
Chapter III presented the methodology for simulating realistic traffic patterns and
generating TPMS packets from that data. This utilized features built into Simulator
for Urban MObility with additional post-processing to generate TPMS packets. The
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resulting simulation provided observations at a variable number of intersections in a
map of downtown Dayton, OH. An Association algorithm was used to create virtual
identities from these observations by correlating tire IDs observed in close proximity.
A basic Route Reconstruction algorithm was presented to turn the potentially sparse
observations into complete paths using the knowledge of the area. Finally, this chap-
ter proposed TORI, a solution to many of the vulnerabilities present in TPMS and
operating within the design constraints of the current system.
Chapter IV presented the results of testing on the Associator and Route Recon-
structor. The experiment was conducted under 9 different conditions, varying Traffic
Density and Detector Density, with numerous seeds to examine variation. The Asso-
ciator was shown to group tire IDs with fairly high accuracy, even in sparse detection
environments. These observations could then be sent to a Route Reconstruction al-
gorithm to turn sparse paths into complete paths, with an accuracy relative to traffic
density. Finally, TORI was examined to describe how it combats the current attacks
and what new attacks may be possible, albeit with a significantly higher cost to the
attacker.
5.4 Contributions
This research presented new work using simulation to demonstrate vulnerabilities
that had only been briefly explored before. Previous work had been primarily signals
oriented and was demonstrated in a specific set of real-world experiments [7]. The
construction of a simulation, Associator, and basic Route Reconstruction showed that
the methods used by those researchers to harvest packets could be deployed in a wide
area for a new effect. This research also proposed a new iteration of TPMS protocol
that differs from other solutions by operating within the current design constraints
and even leveraging them in new ways. Beyond the simulation infrastructure that
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was built and could be used for other experimentation, the results of these experiment
demonstrated two primary conclusions. One is that tracking is feasible with relatively
little infrastructure or complex technology, being able to associate tires with vehicles
with high accuracy which can be leveraged for a variety of attacks. The other is that
a rolling ID scheme can significantly raise the level of effort required to exploit such a
system, in these cases reducing the effectiveness by over 90% and even reducing the
ability to track the unsecured devices by 30%.
5.5 Future Work
This thesis focused on how the absence of security in TPMS can lead to one type
of privacy exploitation. This required adapting and constructing new programs and
limited the scope of this project. After a small foray into the signals involved in
TPMS, research quickly moved into simulation to allow for further proof-of-concept
research. There are many pieces that should be explored in greater detail, given more
time or a different research angle. These include:
• More Proof-of-Concept attacks
• Increasing the size of the simulation and including more diverse traffic conditions
• Implementing intelligent selection of intersections for detectors, such as in traffic
chokepoints, or at all n-way intersections requiring a minimum threshold for n
• Test new algorithms or heuristics
• Apply machine learning to the general association problem, or routing on a
specific map
• Apply the workflow and algorithms for association and route reconstruction to
a different identification technology
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• Executing a small-scale real-world test
• Build hardware intermediaries to test the physical requirements and implica-
tions of TORI
5.6 Final Remarks
Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems are of great benefit to drivers, and have surely
prevented accidents since their inception. Despite their seemingly insignificant value
or impact from a cyber-attack perspective, the safety-critical nature and number of
devices present demands that they be given a fair investigation. This thesis examined
some of the issues that the current generation of TPMS is already vulnerable to, and
demonstrated that an attacker with enough determination could use these devices to
establish pattern-of-life or actual travel route data. This could be used for benevolent
or nefarious means, but is not an intended outcome of the technology and should
therefore be a concern for the consumer. The current state of TPMS security is
not necessarily the result of neglect; rather, it shows that even the smallest detail
could lead to exploitation, and the next generation of devices should take measures
to combat the threats that are currently known, and proactive security measures to
block new attacks.
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